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The background for this thesis stems from the limited research into; and the challenges 
associated with development of preparedness in the Arctic. The main thesis question to answer 
is “How could social relations and cultivation of tacit knowledge improve preparedness in the 
Arctic?”. The thesis question is derived from the literature review and initial results of the pre-
study of this thesis.  
The theoretical framework for this thesis is springs out of acknowledged literature within the 
fields of preparedness and organizational learning. The literature chapter starts with discussing 
the current state of the fields, including ongoing debates, different perspectives and approaches. 
Following up with a presentation of Communities of Practice as a concept for building social 
relations through shared experience and common goals, before presenting an approach to 
management of tacit knowledge. Concluding with a condensation of the literature discussion 
resulting in the analytical approach for this thesis. 
The thesis is performed as a qualitative case-study and sources its data from semi-structured 
interviews and participatory observation. The empirical findings are presented and analyzed 
thematically in relation to the underlying research questions. The findings suggest that 
preparedness organizations learn through both individuals, within the organization and that 
learning can be achieved between organizations as well. Other findings suggest that social 
relations and arenas like one could cultivate through Communities of practice, can be a potent 
asset for cultivation, harnessing, development and sharing of tacit knowledge. Through 
conscious management of tacit knowledge findings suggest that preparedness could be 
improved and developed even further. 
In conclusion social relations and arenas can contribute to development of tacit knowledge, 
which in turn, through proper management can be deployed back to new and existing 
individuals within an organization. Through these processes the inherent preparedness can 
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In the research field of preparedness and crisis-management both exercises and post-crisis 
learning play an important role. Both aspects are found in various adaptations of the 
preparedness phases, comprehensive emergency management, crisis management cycle and so 
on (Alexander, 2002; Kruke, 2015; Pursiainen, 2018). The increased complexity in the world 
around us, with its risks and potential for disaster, sets the stage for this thesis. If we imagine 
preparedness being complex, complicated and challenging at best, under relatively normal 
circumstances, we could imagine the increase in complexity and challenges, when performed 
under harsh arctic conditions. 
The arctic region has been characterized as the modern ages last frontier (Dodds & Nuttall, 
2016). With a few noble exceptions, like seal-hunting, mining and expeditions in the name of 
science (and fame), the arctic region has not been a center for notable activity in the modern 
age. With the change in climatic conditions and the introduction of new technology, the arctic 
region is yet again a thriving region regarding human activity (ibid.). Tourism, research, 
exploitation of natural resources, and new possibilities for naval logistics are some of the 
activities we see in the arctic region today (ibid.). With the current development and the future 
prognosis, it is reasonable to say that the arctic region is thriving and that we must expect that 
the level of activity will increase in the years to come.  
With the current activity of today, and the expected increase of activity in the future, the need 
for preparedness in the arctic is crucial. What seems like regular day-to-day operations on the 
mainland of Europe, Asia or the Americas, could involve significantly higher risk, and potential 
for disaster when performed under arctic conditions, with scarce infrastructure and resources. 
Through the Arctic Search and Rescue Agreement, the arctic states have shined a light on the 
current situation, and the challenges surrounding preparedness in the arctic (Rottem, 2014). 
With an expected increase in the need of efficient preparedness in the Arctic, it would be 
interesting to perform research into different branches of the field of preparedness, to shine a 
light on how preparedness could be increased further. In this thesis I aim to broaden our 
knowledge, through a study of learning in preparedness organizations in Longyear, Svalbard.  
As a starting point for this thesis I examine relevant theories like Eriksson (2015) work with 
organizational learning in preparedness organizations. I reflect upon here work and use it as a 
starting point for my discussion regarding organizational learning in preparedness 




organizational learning (Argyris & Schön, 1996; Eriksson, 2015); or if organizations are 
resistant to learning from crisis, or if  post-crisis learning even is possible (Burgess, Fortune, & 
Peters, 1997; Smith & Elliott, 2007; Toft & Reynolds, 1997). Another dimension and approach 
could be preparedness as planning, where learning has a distinctive role for achieving and 
developing preparedness (Eriksson, 2015). As such making it a viable approach to explore 
further. 
To achieve increased organizational learning in preparedness organizations one could introduce 
other theoretical approaches more related to the field of research on learning. I have chosen to 
deploy acknowledged theories involving Communities of Practice (Wenger, McDermott, & 
Snyder, 2002), where social relations and arenas are important factors for cultivation, 
development and sharing of knowledge between individuals and organizations. To increase the 
potential for organizational learning even further I have also deployed the SECI-model (Nonaka 
& Takeuchi, 1995), to describe and analyze how tacit knowledge could be cultivated, 
transformed and shared between individuals and organizations.  
It is evident that within the current literature, there is an abundant focus on organizational 
learning within preparedness organizations. There is, however, a problem with the predominant 
focus over the last years on crisis prevention, causality and less than optimal approaches to 
post-crisis learning. Another challenge is the gap between operational preparedness capacities 
and preparedness planning. There is a gap in the current literature regarding social relations and 
management of tacit knowledge, and their potential and role for improving preparedness. The 
aim of this thesis is to explore and improve the research field of preparedness even further, 
towards an uncertain future, through broadened knowledge on the afore mentioned subjects I 










1.1 Research Questions 
In this subchapter I present the main thesis question, and the underlying research questions 
associated with it. I have organized it as a broader main thesis question, where I seek to broaden 
our knowledge about the role of social relations, cultivation of tacit knowledge for improved 
preparedness in rural Arctic areas.  
Main thesis question: 
How could social relations and cultivation of tacit knowledge improve preparedness in the 
Arctic?  
The main thesis question is supported by three underlying research questions (RQ), designed 
to answer different dimensions of the main thesis question. I have organized them in a logical 
manner, where the first research question will be a stepping stone for the next, and so on. 
RQ1: 
How does learning occur in preparedness organizations? 
To frame the components of the main thesis question, I first need to explore how learning occurs 
in preparedness organizations. Through this approach I develop a foundation for further 
exploration of social relations and tacit knowledge. 
RQ2: 
How can social relations contribute to learning in preparedness organizations? 
When learning in preparedness organizations are examined, I can explore how social relations 
can contribute to said learning and how it can be an incubator for cultivation of tacit knowledge. 
RQ3: 
How can management of tacit knowledge affect organizational learning in a 
preparedness perspective?  
At last I seek to answer how management of tacit knowledge affect and contribute to learning 
in a preparedness perspective. Through the three research questions I will get a robust stance 









While the phenomenon this study will investigate is organizational learning in preparedness 
organizations, the practical context of this study will be carried out in Longyearbyen, Svalbard. 
In this chapter and the following sub-chapters I will describe the geographical context at 
Svalbard and why I consider Svalbard and the preparedness community there to be a good 
foundation for research towards the afore mentioned phenomenon. 
Svalbard is a Norwegian archipelago in the Arctic Ocean, situated north of mainland Europe 
about midway between continental Norway and the North Pole. Administratively, Svalbard is 
not part of any Norwegian county, but forms an unincorporated area administered by a governor 
appointed by the Norwegian government (Barr & Thuesen, 2019). As of 2016, Svalbard’s 
population was 2,667, mostly situated in Longyearbyen (from here on: Longyear), the largest 
settlement on the archipelago and the seat of the governor (ibid.). 
The archipelago features an Arctic 
climate with long, cold winters and 
short, cool summers, although with 
significantly higher temperatures than 
other areas around the same latitude 
because of the North Atlantic Current 
system (Barr & Thuesen, 2019). Still, 
the average summer temperature is 
considered low, with temperatures 
between four to six degrees Celsius, 
and January averaging temperatures 
between -16 to -12 degrees Celsius 
(ibid.). Svalbard is where cold polar 
air from the north, and mild, wet sea 
air from the south meet, creating low pressure fronts, dynamic weather and strong winds (ibid.). 
Glacial ice covers about 60% of the archipelago, about 30% is barren rock and approximately 
10% is vegetated (ibid.).To understand why Svalbard can be viewed as a good starting point 
for research on the topic of preparedness, one could examine the map (figure 1) to get an idea 
of the conditions Svalbard is subject too. As the archipelago is so remote and subject to harsh 
climate conditions, errors and mistakes here may prove far more harmful than on the mainland.  
Figure 1: Location of Svalbard in dark green, mainland Norway in light 






This is also obvious in the preface for the overall contingency plan the local government in 
Longyearbyen  “Preparedness is important in all contexts and in all parts of society. Perhaps 
even more important here in Longyearbyen, as in many contexts we become very alone and 
must manage ourselves over a long period of time” (Longyearbyen Lokalstyre, 2017).1 These 
examples illustrate some of the challenges when it comes to preparedness in remote areas, hence 
the need for more research and better knowledge about elements relevant for preparedness 
under harsh conditions and limited resources. 
 
2.1 Lufttransport Search and Rescue Service 
Lufttransport AS provides search and rescue services and operates two Super Puma rescue 
helicopters for the Governor of Svalbard (Justis- og Beredskapsdepartementet, 2012).2 The 
rescue helicopters have the capacity to pick up 18 distressed people within a radius of 120 
nautical miles. Furthermore, the rescue helicopters are in a 24-hour emergency preparedness 
and constitute a significant resource for the Governor of Svalbard in rescue operations 
(Sysselmannen på Svalbard, 2016).3 The search and rescue service are a vital component of the 
overall preparedness at the archipelago of Svalbard and will serve as key actor in this thesis. 
 
2.2 The Governor of Svalbard 
The Governor of Svalbard is the highest representative of the Norwegian Government on 
Svalbard and has overall responsibility for societal safety and security and preparedness on 
Svalbard as police officer and county governor (Sysselmannen på Svalbard, 2016). As police 
officer on Svalbard, it is the Governor that leads the local rescue center. The local rescue center 
in turn, is subject to the Main Rescue Centre in Northern Norway (Justis- og 
Beredskapsdepartementet, 2012). It is the same laws and regulations that lay the guidelines for 
police work on Svalbard as on the mainland. The police department consist of a chief police 
officer and twelve police officers; performing around the clock preparedness with at least two 
policemen on duty (Direktoratet for samfunnssikkerhet og beredskap, 2016). The Governor 
disposes two rescue helicopters operated by Lufttransport AS. The Service vessel M/S 
Polarsyssel is another important resource that is on standby nine months of the year. The 
Governor annually carries out several training sessions and collaboration exercises with 
                                                 
1 Local government in Longyearbyen. 
2 Ministry of Justice and Public Security. 




emergency agencies, helicopter crew, Red Cross and tour operators within rescue and 
coordination (Sysselmannen på Svalbard, 2016). The Governor of Svalbard’s role for 
coordination and overall preparedness are vital factors for the various activities taking place in 
the region. Thus, making The Governor of Svalbard a key actor in this thesis. 
 
2.3 Thesis Background 
The project started in December 2017, during a feedback session of one of the subjects in the 
master course, that semester. Our professor noticed my interest in search and rescue in northern 
Norway and suggested that I should consider a master thesis within this field, with an arctic 
perspective. I was intrigued by the idea, and the thought of doing my master project at Svalbard, 
at 78 degrees north. After a preliminary meeting with Are Sydnes, I had a list of names and 
roles in the preparedness community at Svalbard, that I was strongly encouraged to contact, and 
discuss the possibilities for cooperation for my master project. Just in time before the start of 
my last year at the master’s program, I had secured a cooperation with the search and rescue 
service at Svalbard, and the planning could start. In the middle of December 2018, I travelled 
to Longyearbyen to start the first field-study. where I met up with key actors in the preparedness 
community in Svalbard, conducted interviews, participated in a full-scale crisis exercise, 
observed the search and rescue service during both training and a live mission, and got the 










In this chapter I will go through and discuss relevant literature for this study. I will start with a 
short description of preparedness in general and follow through with a broader discussion about 
preparedness and organizational learning. Towards the end of the literature chapter I will 
present theory related to Communities of Practice and theory related to the harnessing of tacit 
knowledge. I will conclude the literature chapter with a synthetized analytical model, where I 
unite preparedness, Communities of Practice and tacit knowledge. This model will serve as my 
analytical tool later when I analyze my empirical findings and discuss the broader implications 
of the theories applied in the model.   
 
3.1 Preparedness as a Process 
When we examine preparedness as a process, one could employ Roux-Dufort (2007) 
perspective where crisis is perceived as long incubation periods, suddenly manifesting itself in 
a precipitating even. As such, suggesting that crises develop in phases and should be approached 
processual. There are several models that describes preparedness as a process, one of them is 
Alexander (2002) Comprehensive Emergency Management model (CEM). That divides the 
process in to four phases consisting of 1) mitigation; Comprises all actions designed to reduce 
the impact of future disasters. These can be divided into structural measures (engineering 
solutions to problems of safety) and non-structural measures, which include land-use planning, 
insurance, legislation and evacuation planning. 2) Preparedness; Refers to actions taken to 
reduce the impact of disasters when they are forecast or imminent. They include security 
measures, such as the excavation of vulnerable populations and sandbagging of river levees as 
floodwaters begin to rise (thus the planning of evacuation is a mitigation measure, whereas its 
execution is a form of preparedness). 3) Response; Refers to emergency actions taken during 
both the impact of disaster and the short-term aftermath. The principal emphasis is on saving 
and safeguarding human lives. Victims are rescued, and the immediate needs of survivors are 
attended to. 4) Recovery; Is the process of repairing damage, restoring services and 
reconstruction facilities after disaster has struck (ibid.). 
Another approach is the Kruke’s phase model that involves most of the key aspects of CEM as 
seen above, although differentiating at key parts,reduced to three phases; pre-crisis; acute crisis; 
post-crisis (Engen, Kruke, Lindøe, Olsen, Olsen & Pettersen, 2016). At first glance both models 
seem quite similar, and they are. Although, they differentiate at key parts. Whereas the CEM 




Kruke’s phase model examines the post-crisis phase, as adaptation to the new normal situation, 
making it more in line with the complex work of modern-day preparedness.  
 
Figure 2: Kruke’s phase model (Kruke, 2015). 
 
When I set out to study learning in preparedness organizations, I will discuss both preparedness 
as both a process and a phenomenon and seek to relate it to organizational learning. In the 
following sub-chapters I will go through preparedness in relation to organizational learning, 
followed up by theories related to Communities of Practice and management of tacit 
knowledge. 
 
3.2 Preparedness in Relation to Organizational Learning 
In the literature we find different perspectives on preparedness. At one side we find a focus on 
activities, and a view of preparedness as activities undertaken before a crisis. On the other side 
we find an understanding of preparedness as an activity to foresee potential problems and to 




a third approach, where one could see preparedness as planning, and that preparedness planning 
could be focused on planning as a learning process (ibid.). When it comes to learning in this 
context, scholars disagree about the level at which learning takes place. The concept of learning 
is multifaceted and is argued to be a conceptual minefield (Levy, 1994). In regards of 
preparedness (planning), learning could be grouped into three perspectives regarding; who 
learns; what is learned; and how to learn (Eriksson, 2015, p. 520). When arguing who learns; 
one perspective suggests that learning only can take place on the individual level, whereas other 
perspectives suggests that learning indeed can take place on the organizational level (Argyris 
& Schön, 1996), thus through the individuals in the organization (Argyris & Schön, 1996; Levy, 
1994). As such, it would be interesting to explore how an organization could extend and 
broaden its learning potential, through preparedness planning and execution. Another 
dimension could be in which way organizations accumulate, refine and finally implements 
knowledge throughout the organization. 
A major controversy in the field is the relationship between organizational and individual 
learning. Is organizational learning simply the sum of individuals who have learned (Eriksson, 
2015, p. 520), or could it be viewed as something bigger? Learning may be viewed as an 
individual learning on their own, or an organization doing an operationally focused self-
evaluation, (e.g. repeated attempt at the same problem with no variation of method and without 
ever questioning the goal), elsewhere referred to as single-loop learning (Argyris & Schön, 
1978, 1996, 1997). For individuals to learn, there must be something for them to acquire or 
draw from direct or indirect experience. This something will be the content of what is being 
learned (e.g. the information and skills obtained through experiences and/or introduced 
knowledge). Examples on the content of learning could be; specific skills, specific behavior, 
how to understand and interpret situations, or the use of tools and equipment (Sommer & Njå, 
2012, p. 221). While the debate regarding levels of learning goes on, it would nevertheless be 
valuable to broaden our perspective on the interaction between single- and double-loop 
learning, and how this applies when it comes to learning and obtaining critical skills, behavior 
and situational understanding in preparedness organizations. 
Learning may also involve change at the strategic level, where individuals or organizations are 
able to reflect upon, question and modify goals, values, assumptions and policies, or what is 
often labelled double-loop learning (Argyris & Schön, 1978, 1996). While we have several 
schools concerned about organization learning, there is opposing scholars arguing that 




research in the field of crisis management of being too focused on crisis causality, prevention, 
response, with limited consideration given to organizational learning from crisis. Birkland 
(2009, p. 148) warns about the risk of superstitious learning; learning without some sort of 
attempt to analyze the underlying problem. One could also view organizational learning in 
contrast to different phases of crisis, as Smith and Elliott (2007) puts it: learning for, as or from 
crisis. Where the idea is that opportunities for learning could manifest in each of the three stages 
of crisis like the pre-event ‘crisis of management’, the focal ‘operational crisis’ or the post 
‘crisis of legitimation. Eriksson (2015) approaches learning through the process of preparedness 
planning, and explores several pedagogical perspectives in that regard, with an emphasis on: 
what is to be learned? The controversies surrounding learning from crisis, and if organizations 
can learn from crisis at all is a valid question, that we as researches and the preparedness 
industry itself, should ask. I think; through controversial questions like this, the industry can 
evolve itself in order to meet the challenges of tomorrow.   
Preparedness planning is about developing abilities to manage future crisis and creating 
learning throughout the organization. Because of this, the crisis management literature focuses 
on learning at the organizational level and in particular on preparedness activities, like exercises 
and risk analysis (ibid). What needs to be pointed out is that preparedness planning is more than 
just separate activities, it is about creating one preparedness process preferably connected to 
other processes in the organization. Eriksson (2015) argues that a learning process must be 
developed to suit the specific organization and its need. 
We could also view preparedness as a phenomenon; being prepared or being in a state of 
preparedness. In the literature there is a somewhat exaggerated focus on planning, procedures 
and regulations, suggesting there is link between these factors and preparedness, and in some 
circumstances; like the political landscape and politicalized perspective on preparedness, one 
could go as far as claiming there is an equal sign between these factors and preparedness 
(Anderson, 2010; Staupe-Delgado, 2018). In other words, written plans, could be viewed as 
physical manifestation of preparedness, and sold off as a positivistic understanding of actual 
preparedness. In other words, planning and plans are not equal to effective and timely 
preparedness, it is just as critical that the organizations utilize learning, and manages to draw 
lessons from future accidents, as well as exercises and training. 
There is a growing body of evidence that organizations are resistant to learning from crisis 
(Burgess et al., 1997; Smith & Elliott, 2007; Toft & Reynolds, 1997). To date, the study of 




limited consideration given to organizational learning from crisis (Smith & Elliott, 2007). 
Despite contrary evidence, an underlying assumption of many studies is that organizational 
learning tends to follow a crisis (Smith & Elliott, 2007, p. 519). If we view preparedness and 
learning together, one could argue that preparedness is about developing abilities and 
capabilities in both organizations and individuals in those organizations, to enhance their ability 
to respond to future crises (Eriksson, 2015, p. 520). Preparedness and learning could and should 
be tightly coupled, without proper learning in hindsight of a crisis, would the following 
casualties and damages be for nothing? Through implementation of learning in the preparedness 
process, it is reasonable to assume that one would be better suited to meet the next crisis than 
the last. 
To increase the potential for organizational learning, both before, during and after a crisis I 
would argue that one must look to more informal and unstructured approaches, arenas and 
processes. Theories around Communities of Practice could be a good foundation for capturing 
and harnessing knowledge (and tacit knowledge) for constructive use and development in the 
future. In the next subchapter I will discuss communities of practice and their role for 
constructive organizational learning, considering how preparedness functions as a relational 
(interpersonal) phenomenon. 
 
3.3 Tacit Knowledge and Preparedness Capacity as a Relational Phenomenon 
In this subchapter I will discuss literature related management of tacit knowledge in relation to 
preparedness capacity. I will utilize literature from the topics of Communities of Practice and 
tacit knowledge management, based on Wenger et al. (2002) practical model for development 
of Communities of Practice. Further on I set out to link the aforementioned to Nonaka and 
Takeuchi (1995) model for harnessing and distributing tacit knowledge. With the purpose of 
synthesizing an analytical framework suited for analyzing the yield of my empirical results 
during this study. 
Individual knowledge could be viewed as a true conviction of the perceived reality (Krogh, 
Lillejord, Nonaka, & Ichijo, 2001, pp. 20-21). One could go further on to view knowledge as a 
construct of reality, rather than a universal or abstract truth. If we break down knowledge to 
more concrete parts, one could see knowledge as explicit or tacit (ibid.). For example, an 
engineer would display their knowledge about designs in the form of a blueprint and detailed 




senses, skills, dexterity, individual perception, physical experiences and intuition. Tasks like 
interpretation of complex data or performing search and rescue operations under harsh 
conditions, requires knowledge that is not necessarily available in manuals and handbooks, and 
hardly could be performed by an untrained novice (ibid.). To acknowledge the value of tacit 
knowledge and manage it, is one of the core challenges in organizations that relies on 
knowledge development. The arenas for development of tacit knowledge is found in 
interpersonal relationships, between individuals that share a common desire to develop 
knowledge within their respective fields, making tacit knowledge a powerful tool for innovation 
(ibid.). To lay the grounds for efficient development of knowledge could be challenging. Hence, 
it is important to facilitate these interpersonal arenas, to achieve knowledge development. An 
approach to this could be Communities of Practice, that through common arenas suitable for 
development of interpersonal relationships, could facilitate to the development of tacit 
knowledge. 
3.3.1 Development of Communities of Practice 
A Community of Practice can take many forms, and can be as diverse as the situations that 
produce them (e.g. long-lived vs. short-lived, collocated vs- distributed,  ad-hoc vs. intentional, 
and so on), however, they all share a unique combination of three fundamental elements: a 
domain of knowledge, which defines a set of issues; a community of people who care about this 
domain; and the shared practice that they are developing to be effective in their domain 
(Wenger et al., 2002, pp. 26-27). These terms constitute what the authors label the structured 
model for developing Communities of Practice, which will be elaborated on in the following: 
Domain: The work of negotiating a shared domain is critical to community development. A 
community must ask itself: What topics and issues do we really care about? How is this domain 
connected to the organization’s strategy? What is in it for us? What are the open questions and 
the leading edge of our domain? are we ready to take some leadership in promoting and 
developing our domain? What kind of influence do we want to have? (Wenger et al., 2002). 
Addressing these types of questions will help a community develop a shared understanding of 
its domain, find its legitimacy in the organization, and engage the passion of its members. When 
it comes to preparedness (both planning and execution), the domain aspect is important. It sets 
boundaries, formative values and gives guidance. Through reflections like the questions above, 
both individuals and organizations could take the firsts steps towards developing a 




Community: The community element needs attention, organization, and nurturing: What roles 
are people going to play? How often will the community meet, and how will members connect 
on an ongoing basis? What kinds of activities will generate energy and develop trust? How can 
the community balance the needs of various segments of members? How will members deal 
with conflict? How will newcomers be introduced into the community? (Wenger et al., 2002). 
Addressing these types of questions will enable the community to find its specific ways to 
operate, to build relationships, and to grow. Mutual trust, continuity and adaptability is all 
important factors when it comes to preparedness, and especially search and rescue operations. 
When these factors are addressed and implemented, the Communities of Practice could start 
serving as an incubator for knowledge development. 
Practice: Any community with sustained interactions in a domain will develop some kind of 
practice over time. Nevertheless, a community can become proactive in taking charge of the 
development of practice. What knowledge to share, develop, document? What kinds of learning 
activities to organize? How should the knowledge repository be organized to reflect the practice 
of members and be easily accessible? When should processes be standardized and when are 
differences appropriate? Where are sources of knowledge and benchmarks outside the 
community? (Wenger et al., 2002). These are the kinds of questions that will help a community 
intentionally become an effective knowledge resource to its members and to other 
constituencies that may benefit from its expertise. Practice could be viewed as one of the most 
important parts of Communities of Practice, this is where the knowledge starts, and where it 
could develop further. Through interactions between individuals and organizations, knowledge 
can be cultivated and nurtured. Here tacit knowledge could take the leap from the individuals 
mind, over to other individuals and hopefully into the organizations itself, making the 
knowledge available for all personnel that could benefit from it, and possibly develop it even 
further. 
To summarize one could view Communities of Practice as framework, foundation or an 
incubator for development of knowledge. Depending on the desired goals of these endeavors, 
Communities of Practice could also be helpful tool for harnessing and capturing knowledge, 
both explicit and tacit, although tacit being more challenging. Nevertheless, tacit knowledge 
could serve as a powerful tool for broadened understanding and development of knowledge. In 
relation to the field of preparedness one could argue that knowledge in general, and tacit 




As this study sets out to explore learning and preparedness, I will utilize theory related to 
management of tacit knowledge and pursue this topic in the next subchapter. 
3.3.2 Management of Tacit Knowledge 
As with Krogh et al. (2001) view on knowledge and Communities of Practice, Nonaka and 
Takeuchi (1995) also have a viewpoint of tacit knowledge opposed to explicit knowledge and 
describes a process of alternating between the two of them in their model. Tacit knowledge is 
personal, context specific, and subjective; whereas explicit knowledge is codified, systematic, 
formal, and easy to communicate, as we will examine in Figure 2 illustrating the SECI-model 
(Nonaka & Takeuchi, 1995).  
The tacit knowledge of key personnel within the organization can be made explicit by processes 
of socialization (tacit-to-tacit), i.e. acquiring the tacit knowledge of others through interaction 
for example through meetings or shared experiences (ibid.). This could be seen in relation to 
Communities of Practice, and the importance of social arenas for exchange of knowledge and 





cultivation of both explicit and tacit knowledge. Building up under the argument that 
Communities of Practice could be utilized as an incubator or facilitator for development and 
management of tacit knowledge. As we have seen in the previous chapters, learning is a vital 
part of preparedness, and increased utilization of tacit knowledge for the purpose of creating 
knowledge and further learning, must be viewed as an asset in any preparedness organization. 
In the next step, the acquired knowledge is articulated and created in a corresponding process 
of externalization (tacit-to-explicit) i.e. blueprints, images, written documents (ibid.). When a 
functioning Communities of Practice is effective, the tacit knowledge that has been amassed 
and shared through socialization, could be codified, formalized and finally be distributed to 
relevant actors, throughout the organization or even between organizations. Combination 
(explicit-to-explicit) refers to the ability of individuals or organizations to cross-reference 
multiple bodies of explicit knowledge and to connect them to a coherent whole. Examples of 
this could be collection of explicit knowledge either inside or outside the organization and 
combined or edited to form new knowledge (ibid.). In this phase knowledge and experience 
from different actors have the potential to melt together across organizational or traditional 
vocational barriers, making it possible to achieve even greater knowledge than one individual 
or organization would do by itself. For preparedness actors in isolated rural areas, the possibility 
to interact and share knowledge must be viewed as more than just luxury, it is a vital factor for 
meeting new threats and reducing the likelihood of unwanted incidents. The knowledge can 
then be incorporated into new products and processes for later internalization (explicit-to-tacit), 
i.e. embodying externalized knowledge in employees and/or applying it in practice (ibid.). For 
a preparedness organization it is vital to share and distribute knowledge that could reduce the 
likelihood of risks and unwanted incidents, the process of externalization is a critical part to 
achieve that goal.  The four processes of the SECI-model are continuously iterated as 
knowledge generation proceeds, illustrated by the spiraling arrow in the center of the model 
(ibid.). There is a corresponding difference in knowledge content in which tacit knowledge not 
necessarily needs to be expressed verbally but can be transferred by watching someone doing 
or demonstrating a task. Externalized knowledge, on the other hand, is expressed by word and 
preferably in standardized formats such as reports and handbooks.  
To summarize, management of tacit knowledge could be viewed as a key asset when it comes 
to increasing knowledge in an organization. It seems like it would be even more critical for 
preparedness organizations, to increase their knowledge, in order to meet new and complex 




for effective preparedness. Further on Communities of Practice could be an effective facilitator 
for releasing and harnessing tacit knowledge, both from individuals but also across 
organizations and different branches. 
 
3.4 Analytical Approach 
In the previous sub-chapters I have discussed literature and theories related to preparedness, 
learning, knowledge, Communities of Practice and management of tacit knowledge. In this sub-
chapter I will seek to bind all these perspectives together, resulting in the analytical approach 
for this thesis. 
As examples on the broader perspective on preparedness we have seen several models and 
approaches. Like comprehensive emergency management (Alexander, 2002) and Kruke’s 
phase-model, comprising three continuous phases from pre-crisis, via acute-crisis to post-
crisis, where Kruke (2015) goes a step further when it comes to learning in relation to 
preparedness; stressing the fact that one does not restore back to the previous normal situation, 
but rather learn from the crisis and establish a new normal situation.  
Further on we have seen a discussion on literature regarding preparedness in relation to 
organizational learning, showing us two branches in relation to individual versus organizational 
learning; is both possible, or does learning only occur at the individual level? In my discussion 
I argue that it would be valuable to broaden our perspective on the interaction between single- 
and double-loop learning (e.g. individual vs, organizational). The other branch revolves around 
the question; can organizations learn from crisis? Where opposing scholars argue for and 
against. In my discussion I argue that controversial questions like this is important to push us 
as researchers, and the industry itself forward, and force us to evolve with the ever-evolving 
world around us. Further on I argue that preparedness and learning could and should be tightly 
coupled, and that it is reasonable to assume that one through implementation of learning would 
be better suited to meet the next crisis. 
To increase the potential for organizational learning in all three phases of crisis I propose that 
one must look to more informal and unstructured approaches, arenas and processes. Hence my 
focus on the theories surrounding Communities of Practice (Wenger et al., 2002) and 
management of tacit knowledge (Krogh et al., 2001; Nonaka & Takeuchi, 1995). In this 
construct, I view Communities of Practice as an incubator or facilitator, to expose, harness, 




For this process to happen it is vital that there are a Domain setting the framework and limits 
for the Communities of Practice to evolve in (Wenger et al., 2002). In this thesis I would argue 
that the domain are the preparedness challenges presented by the harsh environment and 
conditions in the Arctic region. In the domain, we would need a Community of actors with a 
common goal of increasing their mutual knowledge (ibid.), that would be the preparedness 
actors (individuals and organizations) at Svalbard, that interacts with each other in a 
constructive way sharing Practice (ibid.). Through this process a Community of Practice would 
form and evolve, laying the groundwork for exposing and harnessing tacit knowledge.  
Management of tacit knowledge is a key part of this thesis and could be done through the steps 
of Nonaka & Takeuchi’s SECI model, describing how tacit knowledge could be cultivated 
between individuals and within and between organizations. Through the processes of 
Socialization, where tacit knowledge is shared between individuals, Externalization where 
knowledge is made explicit, through physical manifestation, via the process of Combination 
where knowledge can be integrated, and finally implemented to new individuals through the 
process of Internalization. 
In this thesis the afore mentioned perspectives serve the purpose of bridging the field of 
preparedness with learning. Through literature and theory, I have drawn a path between the two 
different fields and shined a light on different perspectives and approaches. To analyze learning 
in preparedness organizations, I have narrowed down to this analytical approach. The combined 
theories provide a robust framework for further analyze of the empirical findings from my 
research in Svalbard. Further on, my analytical approach will set the framing for my discussion 
later in the thesis. 
The aim and ambition of the analysis to follow is to contribute with new knowledge on the 
relationship between learning and preparedness, and more specifically how relational capacities 
and management of tacit knowledge could be an asset for improved preparedness. In this way 
the thesis critically engages with the work of Eriksson et al., Argyris & Schön, Smith & Elliot 
and many more, by building on their research into the field of learning in preparedness 
organizations, while drawing on the works of Wenger et al. and Nonaka et al. where I seek to 
elevate the role of (management of) tacit knowledge within the Communities of Practice. While 
the previous discussions regarding learning and preparedness have resulted in an analytical 









In this chapter I will elaborate on the methodological approach for the project. In the following 
sub-chapters I will discuss relevant research designs, collection of data, and lastly ethical 
reflections in relation to this thesis. 
 
4.1 Research Design 
The social science inquiries are about how one should collect information about a social 
phenomenon and how to analyze this information so it can provide insight into social conditions 
and processes (Johannessen, Christoffersen, & Tufte, 2011). In the following chapter I will 
explain the process and the choices I have made through the process. All interviews were 
conducted in Norwegian, and it is important to stress that all quotes used in this thesis is 
translated from Norwegian to English. In translation theory, there are two main schools of 
thought, the word-for-word approach of instrumental translation, and the sense-for-sense 
approach of hermeneutic translation (Venuti, Gouanvic, & Simon, 1991). Venuti et al. (1991) 
argues that the hermeneutic model is to be preferred over its instrumental counterpart as it offers 
a more sophisticated account of translation that is not only comprehensive but also ethical 
(ibid.). As such, I have utilized the hermeneutic approach of sense-for-sense since it conveys 
the best approach for translation from Norwegian to English, rather than instrumental 
translation, where I would risk to loose much of the original meaning in the interviews. 
4.1.1 Case Design 
Through my research design I have decided to perform this thesis as a case study. The research 
approach is used within multiple disciplines and contains a study of one or several cases over 
time, through detailed and extensive data collection (Andersen, 1997; Yin, 2014). In this case, 
I have studied preparedness organizations at Svalbard, to illustrate how organizational learning 
in preparedness organizations could take place, and how Communities of Practice within and 
among those organizations could be a source for organizational learning, and utilization of tacit 
knowledge. The design was chosen in relation to the main thesis question and the purpose of 
this study. Through the case study approach, I could narrow the focus to the specific case and 
draw conclusions on the research questions; and was as such given the opportunity to illustrate 
specific topics in an analytical setting (Andersen, 1997; Yin, 2014). The following inquiry is of 
a qualitative nature, which implies a preoccupation with studying a phenomenon, to earn new 




In social science it is a goal to integrate theory and empirical findings. This is achieved in this 
thesis, with the case study being theoretically interpretive, where general insight and theory is 
used to explain the case that is being studied (Andersen, 1997, p. 70). The theory has not been 
based on a single theory or model, but rather been constructed by employing and combining 
elements from various theories (Blaikie, 2010, p. 155). Since the aim of the study is to 
contribute to research, the theoretical framework has been shaped on established academic 
literature on preparedness, organizational learning including sub-topics like Communities of 
Practice and management of tacit knowledge; with the aim of contributing to the field of 
research and broadened understanding of said topics. 
 
4.2 Data Collection  
The material for this study is based on observation of preparedness actors in the field and 
exercise Polar Night (Øvelse Mørketid), accompanied with interviews conducted with both 
operational preparedness actors and administrative employees of various preparedness actors. 
To strengthen the empirical foundation, I have gathered data through semi-structured interviews 
and participatory observations. In support of constructing the research design and interview 
guide, I have utilized several documents involving preparedness and risk analyses on Svalbard. 
Although they have not served in an empirical fashion, they have been useful to develop a 
timely and relevant research design. In the following sub-chapters I will elaborate on the 
processes of data collection, design of the interview guide, and lastly analysis and presentation 
of data. First, I want to give a review of the decisions regarding selection of informants. 
4.2.1 Informants 
Informants where recruited through the snowball-approach. Researchers at the University of 
Tromsø, with in-depth knowledge about the preparedness community at Svalbard, 
recommended potential partners for the thesis. I contacted some of the preparedness actors in 
Longyear and presented my project. Through this initial contact, I got contact details to other 
potential informants in Longyear. Within my first trip to Longyear, I had informants from most 
of the actors and organizations in the 
preparedness community at Svalbard. In 
table 1, I have sorted the informants by their 
respective organizations, represented with 
Lufttransport Svalbard in red; that performs 




search- and rescue services (SAR) on behalf of The Governor of Svalbard (GoS) in blue. To 
ensure the informants privacy I only refer to them by the informant codes as listed in table 1. 
4.2.2 Participatory Observation 
This study aims to understand how organizational learning can unfold in preparedness 
organizations, and how tacit knowledge could be harnessed, refined and redeployed back to 
new and existing individuals in the organizations; illustrated by the preparedness community 
on Svalbard. While I have some operative experience, there is a limited turnover to the world 
of civil emergency management. As such, it was very helpful for me to be able to observe how 
the actors worked together. I was fortunate enough to be able to participate in a real rescue 
mission with the search and rescue service and a police officer; witness a training session from 
the helicopter; and was invited as an observer during the collaboration exercise Polar Night. 
This helped me to better understand the context these actors where working in, and thus better 
understand and interpret the information from the informants. Observation can furthermore 
provide valuable information in the form of information that may be difficult for informants to 
express during an interview and give answers to silent truths or conditions one takes for granted 
(Johannessen et al., 2011). One example of this I observed, was how different some actors 
would communicate with other actors that they knew well versus actors they did not have same 
familiarity with. As I got to observe both a real mission, as well as training I was also able to 
observe differences in communication, cooperation and how the actors focused and improvised. 
While most of the informant’s default mindset was “train as you fight” there where will always 
be some nuanced differences between training and the real world.  
In addition to these observations I would argue that I exercised some form of participatory 
observation in relation to the interviews. We usually met some time in advance of the scheduled 
interview, and in many cases got a tour around the office or workplace before the interview. 
While waiting for the informants to be ready for the interview which, I got the opportunity to 
observe them during work, performing daily routine and tasks around me. There was also time 
for casual small talk before and after the interviews which gave me the opportunity to ask more 
informal questions and take part in discussions. I saw this as valuable for interpretation and 
analyze of my research data, later in the process. It is debatable that the informants were 
unaffected by my presence as an outsider in an otherwise tight knit community, and thus 
affecting the credibility of my data collection. The various actors I observed were very aware 
that I was there to perform research and what phenomenon I was researching. Since the purpose 




achieve organizational learning, and how they do it, this could be viewed as a weakness, but I 
would also argue that it gave me the opportunity to ask questions to reproduce a more accurate 
and correct picture of the topics previously discussed, and as such contributing to increase the 
reliability of the project.     
4.2.3 Semi-structured Interviews  
Interview is a valid approach to gain insight into a complex phenomenon, and a common 
starting point for data collection for research designs based in case studies (Yin, 2014). It is in 
the interest of the thesis to have informants who sit with first-hand knowledge of the 
phenomenon inquired. According to Johannessen et al. (2011), to arrive at the experiences and 
perceptions of the preparedness actors, one must talk, interact, listen and ask questions. Through 
qualitative interviews, I was given the opportunity to interact with the informants at their 
workplace, giving me a perspective on their work environment, challenges and opportunities. 
This puts me as a researcher, in a better position to interpret the answers, reflections and 
perceptions offered by the informants (ibid.). 
I chose to employ semi-structured interviews as they have an overall guide or theme, that forms 
the basis for the interview (Johannessen et al., 2011). As such, making it easier to conduct 
somewhat similar interviews, while at the same time easing the analysis work afterwards. In 
addition, semi-structured interviews offer flexibility, as the order of questions and topics can 
vary, which in turn opens for a more informal and less rigid setting around the interview. This 
makes the situation more natural and it is easier for the informant to speak freely (ibid.). Since 
semi-structured interviews are flexible in nature, they can vary from informant to informant, 
this can pose challenges in the analysis process where one must look for a pattern in the data 
material, to create an understanding of what is examined (ibid.). A key question related to 
conducting interviews is whether to record the interview or not (Yin, 2014). To ensure best 
possible reproduction of the raw data I recorded the interviews. The informants where informed 
in advance about privacy regulations and their right to privacy, and unhindered withdrawal from 
the thesis, while participating in this study. Recordings where managed and handled in 
accordance with Norwegian regulations on privacy, and quality assured through dialogue with 
NSD. 4  
4.2.4 Interview Guide 
An interview guide could be designed as a list of topics and general questions that are to be 
asked during an interview, where the theme should be relevant in relation to the research 
                                                 




questions and the theme the study aims to answer (Johannessen et al., 2011). How an interview 
guide is designed, can contribute to avoiding an interview effect during the interview, that is, 
the informant is affected by it being an interview, which in turn affects the information the 
informant is sharing (ibid.). By being attentive to the order of the questions one can facilitate 
an open and trusting relationship between informant and interviewer, which in turn leads to 
receiving honest and sincere answers (ibid.). During the interviews I always opened with simple 
question such as asking the informants to elaborate on their background, education and work 
experience. Then, the questions went over to be more related to topics like preparedness, 
organization, and exercise Polar Night. In accordance with the guidelines of Johannessen et al. 
(2011), the interview guide was divided into main topics that are in accordance with the 
theoretical framework for this thesis. The thematization of the interview questions was chosen 
to give both the informants and me as a researcher a better grasp of the topics the interviews 
where meant to cover. This also proved to be helpful later in the analysis work as it helped to 
facilitate, thematization and structuring of the data gathered. At the end of each interview I 
would ask if the informants had something they saw fit to add, or if there where something from 
the interview that needed explanation. 
While the informants were notified ahead of time about the topics of the interview I did not 
share the interview guide in advance. As the preparedness actors on Svalbard is part of a very 
tightly knit community and often meet and speak to each other daily, I thought of the possibility 
of them discussing the interview questions, that could possibly alter the information. I did 
however share the interview guide with them; together with a letter where I presented the thesis 
and me as a researcher; for them to go through it for as long as they needed before the interview 
started. The interviewees were informed about the research ethical rights and was explained 
their right to anonymity and confidentiality, as well as the informants right to withdraw their 
consent and participation in the thesis at any time. This way the informants also had the 
opportunity to examine the questions and make an informed decision if they wanted to 
participate in the thesis, or if there were any questions they did not wish to answer. When 
organizing the interviews in this manor, the informants have some time to reflect upon the 
interview questions, themes and possible implications of their participation or the information 
they volunteer. As such, I as a researcher must consider the possibility for answers being altered 
or adjusted by the informant. In an effort to ensure the integrity of the data I interviewed several 
informants within several organizations and performed participatory observation at the 




4.2.5 Analysis and Presentation of Data 
A qualitative approach to a research study can amount to large amounts of information 
(Johannessen et al., 2011). Combined with the choice of conducting semi-structured interviews, 
can pose challenges in the analysis process in relation to sorting and getting an overview of 
essential and relevant data (ibid.). As such, it can be argued that the purpose of the data analysis 
in this thesis is both to organize the interpret the data material (ibid.). Yin (2014) stress that in 
case studies this phase of the research process is a critical aspect of the research process, while 
being one of the least-developed aspects. In line with one of the proposed strategies for Yin 
(2014), I decided to let the research questions be the analytical strategy that points out the 
overall direction for analyzing and summarizing the data in this study. These research questions 
formed the basis for the design of the theory chapter, as well as the interview guide, and it was 
therefore logical to follow this structure also in the analysis. 
The analysis process for this research study has followed what Yin (2014) explains as a circle 
involving “your original research questions, the data, your defensive actions and interpretations 
of the data and your ability to state some findings and draws as conclusions” (Yin, 2014, p. 
136). The analysis would start already the same night after a long day of data collection on 
Svalbard, where I daily would write a field diary with key notes, my thoughts, reflections and 
new questions for the next day. In between field trips to Svalbard I would transcribe and 
anonymize the interviews and attempt to see the data I collected in a larger setting, rather than 
just day for day. I would then write down interesting topics I felt had not been explored 
thoroughly enough, to consider investigating on the next trip to Svalbard. In the data I found 
both common features and similarities across the informants and organizations, though with 
varying perspectives. When the interviews were transcribed, I made schematic reviews where 
I categorized what the various informants said about different topics, narrowing the data down 
to recurring themes. This is called data reduction and data display (Mehmetoglu, 2004). “Data 
reduction is to reduce the amount of data without losing important information. It happens by 
encoding and segmenting the data” (Mehmetoglu, 2004, p. 100). Data display, on the other 
hand, is about showing how the researcher have organized and summarized the data (ibid.). 
Finally, I sorted the data thematically to prepare the data for further analysis. 
The analysis process was based on data from interviews of both operational actors and 
administrative staff, as well as observations. I chose to summarize the presentation of these data 




to both the theory and the empirical chapter, and thus facilitates the structuring of the 
discussion, and makes it easier for the reader to keep track of my research process. 
 
4.3 Research ethical issues and methodological assessments 
A qualitative research project can be evaluated based on the degree of validity and reliability 
(Johannessen et al., 2011). In addition, a research project should consider research ethical issues 
(ibid.). In the following sub-chapter, I will elaborate on how I ensured the ethical standard of 
this thesis. 
4.3.1 Research ethical issues 
In scientific research, ethical considerations may indicate that one avoids to research topics 
where it is difficult, if not impossible, to carry out an ethically justifiably program (Johannessen 
et al., 2011). To carry out an ethically justifiable study, one must make some reflections and 
reservations. In the role as a researcher it is my task to be aware of the situation I put my 
informants in. I ask the informants to provide information he or she has of their working day, 
which could be difficult for the informant. They should be honest when speaking with me, but 
at the same time be loyal to their employer. As such, it is very important that those who sign up 
as informants are referred to as anonymous sources. To comply with the principle of anonymity, 
I have not obtained any information that is of a sensitive nature, or violates the informants right 
to privacy, e.g. data that provides information about the informant as a person. In addition, all 
interviews where anonymized during transcription, where all references to them as individuals 
is removed. This stands out as especially important in a small community like Svalbard and 
provides some extra challenges. As there are so few people involved in the preparedness 
community on Svalbard; it is still likely that other people from said community would be able 
to identify them. I will therefore simply refer to them as informants and their corresponding 
informant codes. 
As a researcher I must also be aware that during interviews I can put the informants in a difficult 
position. Some questions may indicate that the informant does not know what to answer because 
the truth may put the informant in a difficult position, and that the informant rather wishes to 
give an answer that is more socially accepted. It is therefore my duty as a researcher to reflect 
on this in advance of the interview and do my best to avoid this kind of situations. This can be 
done through the design of the interview guide, and through my own behavior during the 
interview. In addition, I must be objective in relation to the data that I get access to. This can 




dominate and characterize the interpretation of the data; If I as a researcher can be objective 
both in the form of my behavior towards the informants, as well as objective in relation to the 
data, I will be able to achieve credibility in relation to the findings I make in my study. 
4.3.2 Validity 
Validity as an evaluation criterion involves several operationalizations. Intern validity, which 
is also called credibility by qualitative studies, poses questions about whether one investigates 
what one is aiming to investigate, and in which degree the findings reflects the purpose of the 
investigation (Johannessen et al., 2011). To strengthen the credibility of this study, I have been 
consistent in the selection of data for the study. As the informants I interviewed and the 
preparedness actors I observed work with each other daily, and exercise Polar Night by and 
large was a collaboration exercise, I feel that the data these informants provided, largely reflects 
the aims of the study. To ensure that the use of central terms is correct, the informants were also 
asked about what they include in various aspects and terms, and after the interviews asked the 
informants of whether they want to add anything or if anything was unclear. By looking at a 
phenomenon from different perspectives, one is better suited to avoid partial and subjective 
findings (Johannessen et al., 2011; Yin, 2014). 
Triangulation assumes that if two or more sources converge on the same conclusion, the data is 
more credible, or in other words: if different data collection methods produce the same findings 
with the same research subjects, the findings may be judged valid (Tracy, 2010, p. 843). In 
contrast to this Tracy (2010) argues that triangulation, like aspects of reliability and validity 
does not necessarily indicate quality in interpretive research. Despite this, multiple sources, 
methods and theoretical lenses is still considered valuable by many researchers from various 
fields (ibid.). As such, I have chosen to not employ extended triangulation while gathering data. 
In my data gathering process, other data collection methods apart from interviews and 
observation, where considered to give little useful data. The documents used for support in the 
initial process of data gathering, would not shed light on the phenomenon under investigation, 
but rather helped frame it and give guidance for important aspects surrounding the field of 
preparedness in the Arctic, thus leaving me with two different methods for data gathering, and 
just partial triangulation. 
External validity, or transferability, says something about the degree to which the study’s results 
can be transferred to similar phenomenon’s, settings, situations and contexts (Mehmetoglu, 
2004). A disadvantage with a qualitative case design is that it is precisely for the purpose to 




generalize. Yin (2014) emphasizes that it is still possible to generalize with case studies, but 
that it is an analytical generalization. Analytical generalization suggests that the purpose of the 
study is to expand and generalize theories, rather than possibly a phenomenon that can be 
transferred to populations (ibid.). While this study attempts to give some generalizations for the 
potential of social relations and how it could support cultivation of tacit knowledge, the main 
objective is to give a detailed insight into a social context, which in turns allow me to discuss 
how these factors contribute to learning among preparedness actors. With this said, I would 
argue that the broadened knowledge about these topics, will be transferable to other contexts as 
well, e.g. developed countries with scarce resources, remote communities in other regions or 
other regions with different climatic challenges. In addition, the findings and analysis within 
the topics of Communities of Practice and management of tacit knowledge, would be possible 
to generalize upon, and be transferable to other fields of research. To improve the transferability 
of qualitative studies, it is important to establish good descriptions, interventions, 
interpretations and explanations that can be used in other contexts (Mehmetoglu, 2004). To 
ensure transferability, I have contributed with rich descriptions of the empirical basis. In this 
way, the reader can make up his or her own opinions and interpretations, and therefore, to a 
greater extent, the findings become a result of the research and not of the subjective 
presentations to me as a researcher.    
4.3.3 Reliability 
Reliability, or consistency, is linked to the selection of the data, the collection and the 
reorganization of the data (Johannessen et al., 2011). As qualitative study collection is often 
less structured, this assessment is not as important in qualitative studies at is in more 
quantitative studies (ibid.). To ensure reliability for this study I have recorded the interviews, 
to ensure accurate and correct reproduction of information from the informants. Additionally, I 
have been working structurally throughout the whole process of gathering, management and 
analysis of the data, to systematize the data that has emerged; which has been included in the 
method chapter as descriptions of the context in which the project has been carried out in. In 
sum, these factors increase the reliability of the study; since the reader themselves is in a better 
position to see how the researcher has arrived at the conclusions he makes (ibid.). Although 
there are several other quality indicators in qualitative research then employed in this thesis, I 
have chosen to go for an extended approach to validity and reliability as quality indicators for 
this thesis. My reasoning for this decision is the choice of qualitative research design, the case 








5 Empirical Findings 
In this chapter I will present and analyze empirical findings. The chapter will be structured 
according to a thematic analysis of the empirical data, where I through several steps of coding, 
have systematized data adhering to recurring themes throughout the dataset. Each subchapter 
will be introduced with a citation or short description of the phenomena at hand, followed by a 
brief discussion about its implications in relation to my analytical model. I set out to enlighten 
the recurring themes, in relation to their corresponding research question, and ultimately end 
up with a coherent analyzation of the empirical data.  
During my first research trip to Svalbard, I was invited to participate in a large-scale crisis 
exercise (Exercise Polar Night), where dozens of actors across the preparedness community 
(and local society at large), came together in a joint exercise, aimed at drilling procedures and 
routines, coordination and cooperation, new crisis management systems, and exposing 
improvement potentials across the various organizations. I and my colleague where allowed to 
interview several of the members of the exercise planning group, senior staff from the local 
government, the Governor of Svalbard and various preparedness organizations. These 
interviews were conducted both before, during and after the exercise, and they complemented 
our observations and impressions as observers in the joint exercise.  
 
5.1 How can Organizational Learning Contribute to Existing Preparedness 
Structures? 
In this subchapter I set out to bridge organizational learning with preparedness structures in 
emergency preparedness organizations. I draw on relevant empirical findings to illustrate and 
exemplify how both the topics could and should be viewed together, to broaden our view on 
learning and preparedness. I will utilize quotes that illustrates relevant points for the analysis, 
the quotes will be referenced to the respective informant code5 and year.6 I have chosen this 
approach to ensure the informants privacy when participating in this thesis. 
 
 
                                                 
5 See table 1 in chapter 4.2.1 Informants 




5.1.1 Environment for Learning 
In this subchapter I will focus on empirical findings related to the theme: environment for 
learning, I will present empirical findings in the form of observations, citations and follow up 
with a brief discussion. This will be the main template for the following sub-chapters under the 
analysis chapter. 
The competence and knowledge requirements required for performing effective search and 
rescue (SAR) in the arctic is immense, one of the operators describes it like: 
“When you start flying SAR, you already have enough competence to be a part of a 
SAR crew. Still, you must go through context specific training for the area, because of 
the challenging environment we operate in, like polar nights, night-vision-flying and so 
on”.  
          (S1, 2018) 
After initial training, for operations in the Svalbard region, crew members still have to 
participate in continuation training with regular intervals. To ensure continuous improvement 
and learning for future operations, we have several systems and approaches; like deviation 
management, debriefing, lessons learned and so on (S1). After every mission, training or live, 
we log the flight (describing flight patterns, what, where and when) in a data log system. In 
addition, we have a debriefing session, where we talk through the mission, and try to identify 
lessons learned if applicable (S1, S2). This complements the deviation management system e.g. 
broken equipment or violated SOP,7 and is an effort to identify what went well, and what did 
not go so well. The lessons learned is supposed to cover new knowledge that could be useful 







                                                 




When training for real emergencies the only approach, is a realistic approach; like one of the 
operators put it: 
“We exclusively exercise and perform training with the equipment and resources we 
would have at hand, in a real emergency”. 
          (S2, 2019) 
Another dimension of organizational learning is exercises, and the importance of ‘realistic’ 
exercises, especially in a preparedness context. As an example, the informant describes regular 
full-scale exercises they participate in, in the Svalbard region. In the example, the Norwegian 
Coast Guard (NGC), is only participating as exercise markers. Although the NGC obviously is 
a preparedness actor in the Arctic, they have an enormous area to cover, causing them not to be 
available as a standing force at Svalbard (S1). This could be compared to the idiom ‘train as 
you fight’, where one would train with the same equipment and resources one has during 
‘peacetime’ as one would utilize during a crisis. With realistic training, under realistic 
conditions the preparedness actors at Svalbard builds up knowledge and experience that are 
transferable to future emergencies. The implication of this being robust preparedness capacities, 
and room for development based in experiences and knowledge achieved before, during and 
after exercises. 
The example above illustrates an important aspect of realistic and efficient preparedness. 
Through realistic and adequate training and exercise, the preparedness organizations build 
realistic capacities. Since the NGC is not a stationary preparedness resource in Longyear, they 
do not involve them as a standing resource while exercising. Although, in the spirit of 
Communities of Practice, they involve the NGC in exercises as a resource and sparring partner, 
and it also facilitates as a platform for building and maintaining professional relationships 
between the NGC and the broader preparedness community in Longyear. In relation to the 
analytical framework the afore mentioned analysis illustrates how organizational learning could 
be an asset for building preparedness. This fits well within the pre-crisis phase in Kruke’s phase-
model and could be viewed as a necessity for building preparedness capacities like Eriksson 
(2015) points out when discussing preparedness planning as activities. As an endnote this 
analysis shows that preparedness organizations are able to learn from past incidents, in contrast 
to Smith and Elliott (2007) assumptions regarding learning from crisis. With that said, there 





5.1.2 Training, Exercise and Mindset 
In this sub-chapter I delve into empirical findings related to the recurring theme of training, 
exercise and mindset and discuss it in relation to learning. As with the previous chapter, 
paragraphs will also here be introduced with a citation that sets the stage and grasps the essence 
of the following paragraph to be discussed. 
Competence, knowledge and regulations will only get you so far when performing SAR mindset 
is equally important, like one of the operators points out: 
“When we go to work every day, it is not enough to just adhere to rules, regulations and 
checklists. You have to do it with a certain mindset!” 
          (S1, 2018) 
During one of my visits to Svalbard and the SAR-service, the informants explained their 
mindset and approach to effective training, to stay current within the various SAR-disciplines. 
Within the SAR-service we have a comprehensive exercise and training regime. It is paramount 
that all operators are up to date, or ‘current’ at all times (S1, S2). It involves theoretical training 
and various mission-specific training (e.g. hoist operations from ships or mountainsides, 
avalanche SAR, cooperation with the NCG, police and so on). By default, they undertake 
training (missions) at least six days a week, and training is only postponed or halted, if a live 
mission occurs (although, live missions are good training as well). All operators in the crews 
are subject to a checklist, that keeps track on their current certification status for various flight- 
and mission-specific prerequisite skills. Different skills or tasks must be certified within 
different time-intervals (e.g. once a year, twice a year, and so on). To keep track and maintain 
an overview of the operators, they use color-coded checkboxes; green = certified, yellow = 
certification soon due, red = certification needed before next rotation (S1).  
The various task, responsibilities and assignments the SAR service is subject to, demands a 
rigorous and at the same time efficient training and exercise regime. While performing complex 
operations (often under extreme weather conditions), it is paramount that every single operator 
has the best possible foundation to perform. Most of the requirements and regulations regarding 
flight operations are given from national and international authorities, and other minor 
procedures are developed and revised at lower levels. Still, these systems can not cover every 
single aspect of training and learning. To harness more knowledge, they utilize a system for 
‘catching’ and managing tacit knowledge from the operators into a structured system, in the 




approach could be viewed as an extension of the role of tacit knowledge, within Communities 
of Practice, and could it could be a driving factor for the evolution of organizational learning. 
 
Even though most days are regular days, one can never get to comfortable. Or as one of the 
informants puts it: 
“There is no such thing as: that is never going to happen” 
      (S1, 2018) 
When talking about the job as a SAR-operator, one of the informants described a ‘regular’ day 
at the SAR-service; the day starts eight in the morning, briefing nine, training-flight ten to about 
eleven, debrief of the training-flight, lunch around twelve. Remainder of the workday involves 
miscellaneous tasks and various paperwork. After four in the afternoon, the crew is still in 
preparedness, and must be available for missions within sixty minutes from initial scramble 
(S1). 
The informant stresses the importance of a good safety-culture in the organization. It is 
important to voice your concerns, if you are not comfortable with the situation, procedure or 
plan (S2). It is equally important that all operators manage to both give and receive constructive 
feedback or advice. To achieve the necessary safety-culture, there are several elements to 
consider. First, it is important to not allow a ‘backstabber’ or ‘rotten apple’ culture manifest, 
through good human factors, CRM8 and training, we aspire to build up and develop both the 
individual, crew and the whole organization to adhere to certain principles, like giving and 
receiving constructive criticism (S1). There are several systems in place to handle an manage 
risk and ensuring safety of operations. It is a mix of systems and regimes that stems from 
European and national rules and regulations regarding air operations, but also ‘homebrewed’ 
systems, that has been developed because one saw the need for them, to ensure the highest 
standards of operation. The informants complement with explaining their approach to SOP: We 
have standard operating procedures (SOP) for basically everything we do, and situations we 
could encounter during operations. It is important to stress that SOP’s are more like a guideline, 
that allows the operators to improvise within certain boundaries, but always with safety as the 
highest priority (S1, S2). 
                                                 




As we have seen in the analysis above, training and exercise can result in organizational 
learning in several forms. When relating this analysis to the analytical framework, we also here 
can see a relation to the Pre-Crisis phase in Kruke’s phase-model, and maybe some aspects 
relevant for the Acute-crisis phase as well. Training and exercise regimes are important 
components for building preparedness capacities and preparing for future incidents (Eriksson, 
2015). The empirical findings suggest that both single-loop and double-loop learning is taking 
place within the organization and that it is a contributing factor to the high preparedness they 
achieve; and their ability to solve their missions in a safe manor. 
 
5.2 How can Social Arenas Contribute to Preparedness? 
During my field trips to Longyear I have witnessed several forms of Communities of Practice; 
some informal, some formal. Within the informal arenas, members of the different 
‘communities’ meet sporadically in both social and professional settings. Regarding the more 
formalized Communities of Practice, there seems to be an abundance throughout the 
preparedness community at Svalbard. There are several formal councils, workgroups and 
project groups concerned with coordination, knowledge sharing, preparedness planning and so 
on. Here we will examine the recurring theme of social arenas and how they can contribute to 
preparedness. 
When talking about the organization and preparedness on Svalbard, an informant from The 
Governor of Svalbard compares it to how its organized on the mainland, where you necessarily 
would not know every member of the regional preparedness council personally, versus Svalbard 
where they meet regularly and often in other settings, with other ‘hats’ on (project management 
for an exercise, preparedness council, local rescue management, and last in the photo-club), 
than on the mainland. This is viewed as a strength (and probably a requirement) on Svalbard, 
because of the scarce infrastructure and limited resources. The Governor of Svalbard is the 
whole state apparatus on Svalbard and covers all government functions there. Hence the need 
for arenas for cooperation and knowledge-sharing. Another perspective could be a comparison 
between the mainland and Svalbard, where most regions at the mainland have several 
municipalities they must interact with, versus Svalbard where they only have one municipality 






When talking about cooperation in relation to preparedness, the informant describes it like this: 
“Svalbard is an Eldorado for preparedness” 
    (P1, 2019) 
Leading up to an explanation about exercises with other actors on Svalbard. Last week we had 
an exercise with Hurtigruten9 that is a private actor at Svalbard. We followed their guides 
(mountaineer guides responsible for tourist groups in the field), observing and giving feedback 
during their safety and security training. We also coordinated with the SAR-service, and 
arranged a visit there for the guides, so they can get to know the SAR-service, and the 
helicopter. This is a good example on how cooperation and more formal Communities of 
Practice could take place, the coordination part with the SAR-service is especially good 
example on how the more informal ties, built up within the Communities of Practice is useful 
for increasing the effect of preparedness training. We cooperate in all areas where we find it 
useful for preparedness at Svalbard, at the exercise in December (Polar Night), we for example 
had a joint project management group consisting of members from the different actors 
participating in the exercise, we have local rescue management, preparedness council and so 
on. This serves as a good example on Communities of Practice and illuminates the potential for 
tacit knowledge with the implications that follows of accumulating and managing it. 
 
To develop social arenas for exchange of knowledge, coordination plays an important role. One 
of the informants states it bluntly: 
 “Believe it or not, not everybody talks with each other” 
      (P1, 2019) 
The Governor of Svalbard has a responsibility to get actors to talk together and get to know 
each other. It could be everything from communications, terminology, and understand each 
other’s organizations. “Not all actors communicate and talk with each other, it is one of our 
responsibilities to facilitate for communication between the actors and get them to know each 
other better” (P1). One example could be an exercise we attended earlier, where two actors in 
the same building, had not coordinated their preparedness plans, resulting in the two actors 
being unaware of each other’s plans and go-to-actions in case of an emergency; “That is 
                                                 




unfortunate. When we ask one of the actors what their neighbors do if something happens, they 
reply ‘we do not know’; there is clearly a potential for improvement here, where more actors 
could get better to see the big picture” (P1). This serves as an example on the importance of 
efficient and timely cooperation and coordination. If we relate it to Wenger et al. (2002) 
approach to Communities of Practice, this clearly is a key component in the community part of 
their steps for cultivation Communities of Practice. Where The Governor of Svalbard through 
their coordinating role brings actors together across the (preparedness) community in Longyear 
and Svalbard as a whole. Through Communities of Practice it is possible to build robust 
foundations and a framework for coordination and cooperation, putting the involved actors in 
position to release and utilize the potential for learning and increased preparedness. 
The following citation gives a good account of the necessary cooperation needed when an 
emergency strike. To achieve this kind of involvement and constructive use of the whole 
organization effective Communities of Practice would serve as a great asset: 
“At The Governor of Svalbard, it is not the police department that responds to a crisis, 
it is the whole office of The Governor of Svalbard, if necessary our cleaners operate our 
public phone in a crisis. Everybody has a place and a role in our preparedness 
organization. All hands on deck, literally means all hands on deck”. 
          (P1, 2019) 
 
When we talk about exercises and cooperation around exercises, the informants stress the 
importance of realistic training, “we train as we fight”. This mindset seems to be inherent in the 
preparedness community at Svalbard:  
“I think cooperation facilitates solutions and flexibility. Good cooperation opens up for 
thinking outside the box and improvise when suitable, that in itself, is a vote of 
confidence”. 
(P1, 2018) 
To acquire and maintain a good environment for cooperation, it is paramount to establish 
relations between the different actors. We must know each other at the personal level, to build 
up and develop cooperation on a ‘daily’ basis. Like me as a preparedness planer, must know 




the plans are good enough, for the operators on the ground to utilize the plans and cooperate 
onsite to solve the emergency or crisis (P1, P2). 
5.2.1 Coffee and preparedness 
The informants stress the importance of the informal ties between the people in general, and 
different actors in the (preparedness) community at Svalbard (P1, P2, S1, S2). There are several 
venues where actors meet in an informal, though social, setting. Informal chats and 
conversations over a cup of hot coffee at the local café Fruene10 localized in the center of 
Longyear is described as an example on a social arena where actors meet (S1). Although the 
conversations hardly consider specific topics related to preparedness, they are important 
‘melting-pots’ for building and developing the social ties among the actors. Another aspect is 
the short span between operators from SAR and the police, they interact daily through their 
work (and periodically on abovementioned Fruene, and other social arenas during their off-
time). Most of the operators in ‘both camps’ know each other well both professionally and 
personally (S1, P1, P2). 
Coffee seems to be an important catalyst for informal social arenas in Longyear. As one of the 
informants puts it: “our coffee machine is the most popular one in all of Longyear” (S1), 
implying that ‘everyone’ in the preparedness community at Svalbard, pops in regularly for some 
hot coffee and a chat at the lunch room in the SAR hangar. During one of my visits to the SAR 
hanger I got to witness the informal meetings unfold, when a police officer from The Governor 
of Svalbard popped in, for a coffee and an informal request for a minor search and rescue 
mission. The officer had seen a post on Facebook, describing that a local resident of Longyear 
had lost their dog pack during dogsledding. Prompting the SAR service if they could do a sweep 
of the nearby areas by helicopter in an effort to locate the missing dog pack11 (P3). I was invited 
to tag along to observe the crew ‘in theater’, and see how a mission unfolds from pre-flight 
planning, search and rescue effort, to final debriefing after the end of the mission. We were 
unable to locate the dog pack, but they were localized by search parties on the ground later on. 
The anecdote above serves as an example on how the informal social arenas translates into 
preparedness action. It could be difficult to imagine something like this happening outside the 
established ‘chain-of-command’ in more urban areas of mainland Norway. Since the social ties 
are so imbedded in everyday life at Svalbard, a minor Facebook post could be enough to trigger 
                                                 
10 Famous café in Longyear  
11 Disclaimer: the search for the missing dog pack, was possible to combine with a mandatory training flight for 




a preparedness effort. Coffee and chats in informal settings could seem arbitrary when 
discussing learning and preparedness, but they serve an important purpose in the development 
and nurturing of Communities of Practice among the preparedness actors at Svalbard. 
 
5.3 Cultivation and Management of Tacit Knowledge 
In this subchapter I will analyze empirical findings related to cultivation and management of 
tacit knowledge. I seek to illustrate how the preparedness organizations approach this form of 
learning and knowledge-making; and relate this to Nonaka and Takeuchi (1995) SECI-model. 
It takes time to develop and maintain competence and knowledge, that in time can become tacit 
knowledge. Here the informant puts it bluntly: 
“When you start in the search and rescue on Svalbard, you either last a year or a 
lifetime”. 
          (S1, 2019) 
The phrase above could be viewed as a harsh statement, but it conceals an important fact. Most 
operators in the search and rescue service has several years, and often decades behind them in 
the service. Operators that for some or another reason does not stay in the service for several 
years, usually quit the service after only a few years (S1, S2). The long service time for many 
of the operators leads to massive cumulation of knowledge, competence and expertise (S1, S2, 
S3, P1, P2). The same goes for police officers at The Governor of Svalbard, that in most cases 
have several years of experience before being considered for a fixed term at Svalbard (P1, P2). 
It would therefore be rational and positive to harness and systematize the hard-earned 
knowledge and put it to use in the organization as a whole, and for new operators that start in 
the service in the future.  
To make use of tacit knowledge, one has to harness it and manage it, like the example given 
from one of the informants here: 
“If you think: ‘this was clever’, and your colleagues should know this, you put it into 
lessons learned, that is aggregated into a database containing accumulated knowledge 
in the organization. This is organizational learning, that allows for transfer of knowledge 
to existing and new crew members” 




To reduce risk and increase our ability to handle upcoming situations, we talk and walk through 
different scenarios, perform risk analysis and assessments, and reflect on unexpected events 
(S2). This prepares our operators on handling a sortie of expected and upcoming situations, as 
well as making them robust enough to be prepared to handle unexpected events. These activities 
include all personnel at the SAR base, crew, administration, the whole organization must be 
committed to safe performance and safe operations (S1, S2). The following quote illustrates 
how the SAR-service cultivate and manage tacit knowledge through externalization (tacit-to-
explicit). 
When tacit knowledge is harnessed, it is equally important that it is managed in a constructive 
way and made available for others, like described by one of the informants: 
“Even if an employee does not work here anymore, we still have a lot of their knowledge 
‘saved’ in our knowledge database, that could be utilized by existing and new 
employees”. 
         (S1, 2018) 
When it comes to organizational learning, the informants from the search and rescue service 
has several approaches and perspectives. The informants stress the importance of involvement 
and participation from ‘all the individuals’ in the organization, and especially in the crew. To 
achieve organizational learning, it all starts with the individuals, and that there is an 
environment for learning (S1, S2, S3, S4). To illustrate, the informants explains the factors 
associated with effective mission planning; where it is important that ‘everybody’ participates, 
making suggestions or contributing with knowledge from their respective areas of expertise 
(e.g. rescue swimmer, technicians, doctor, pilots). In the process of mission planning, regular 
hierarchy is put aside, transforming into a relatively flat structure, where all the different ‘roles’ 
in the crew has a say (and is expected to volunteer suggestions and comments in respect of their 
different areas of expertise). This indicates that there is a proactive focus on participation from 
all the individuals in the organization, that in turn makes up the foundation for a thriving 
environment for learning. This form of organizing the crew could be viewed as a small 
Communities of Practice within the organization and shows how tacit knowledge could be 
drawn out of each individual. This also serves as a good example on  socialization (tacit-to-
tacit) from Nonaka and Takeuchi (1995) SECI-model, where tacit knowledge is made explicit 




The following citation puts the spotlight on an important nuance of learning; do one learn to 
solve repeating problems, or for the skill to improvise in an emergency? One of the informants 
puts it like this: 
“A helicopter pilot flying the same trip back and forth to an oilrig for 1000 hours of 
flight experience, I would argue has one hour of flight experience, a thousand times. 
Whereas here the flights are so varied, so you get lots of varied experience every time 
you fly” 
  (S1, 2019) 
When we see organizational learning as a system, continuous logs and ‘incident databases’ is 
used as examples. These systems represent a new dimension when it comes to organizational 
learning, where tacit knowledge is accumulated and refined into a set of lessons learned, or 
knowledge that others should have, that can be distributed throughout the organization 
systematically, or as a mere tool for learning when new personnel joins the organization. This 
suggests that capturing and management of tacit knowledge pose as an effective and powerful 
asset, when it comes to broadened organizational learning. Through the internal and external 
Communities of Practice, the SAR-service cultivate and acquire tacit knowledge; that is 
systematized via databases, logs and so on. When a new operator joins the organization, tacit 
knowledge can be withdrawn from the database and be put to use with the new operator, thus 
making it possible for the new operator to learn of past events and not necessarily need to 
experience them firsthand. This serves as an example in Internalization (explicit-to-tacit) from 
Nonaka and Takeuchi (1995) SECI-model, where explicit knowledge within the organization 
is incorporated into a new product or process for later internalization, or into a new operator in 
this case. 
Like in the SAR-service, ‘new’ employees in the police department at The Governor of 
Svalbard, has several years of experience before they are eligible to apply and be hired for a 
position at Svalbard, so all personnel have a robust foundation of knowledge and competence 
before they come north (P1). Thus, there is a challenge with the fixed term practice, that only 
allows a police officer to work at Svalbard for a maximum of six years. Because of this 
challenge they know work with a revision of the preparedness plans, including best practices, 
action cards and so on (P1, P2, P3). “We do this work for our successors, not four ourselves”; 
we try to embody so much knowledge and experience as possible in the preparedness plans, at 




here to explain everything (P1). This also serves as a good illustration of internalization 
(explicit-to-tacit) from the SECI-model. As such, the harnessing and management of tacit 
knowledge is a key factor to increase the organizations effective preparedness (P1). 
After studying the preparedness community for several years, one thing seems clear; safety 
always comes first. Through effective approaches to learning, new employees get the tools 
necessary to perform a safe job: 
“How ready are you to work independent shifts, after a couple of months of introduction 
and local training? When does the inexperienced become experienced? My thought is: 
when it is safe!”. 
          (P1, 2019) 
When new employees come up here to work in the police department, we have a mentor 
program, where new colleagues follow a senior officer to meet all actors, get acquainted with 
the local area of Longyear, and the local culture. The mentor takes the new colleague through 
a checklist and makes sure the new colleague is certified to work independent shifts. This serves 
as another example in externalization (tacit-to-tacit) from the SECI-model. No one starting to 
work here has less than ten years of experience from policework on the mainland. Everybody 
has a lot of experience and competence with them from their previous work. The most important 
thing is to get a grasp of the local environment and combine the new knowledge with previous 
knowledge (P1, P2). 
As we have seen in the preceding paragraphs, both the SAR-service and the police department 
under The Governor of Svalbard has systems in place and initiatives going for cultivation and 
management of tacit knowledge. Also, both organizations extract a lot of the accumulated tacit 
knowledge through several Communities of Practice both internal and external. If we view the 
differences we see a larger focus on the organization as a whole at the SAR-service (e.g. all 
individuals contribute knowledge to the organizations, that in turn formalizes it and distribute 
it back throughout the organization), versus an orientation towards individuals at The Governor 
of Svalbard e.g. focus on implementing tacit knowledge from the organization, back to 








In this chapter I will reflect upon and generalize relevant empirical findings from the analysis 
chapter. Further on I will discuss the theoretical implications that follows of the findings and 
how this could affect future theory within the realm of learning in preparedness organizations. 
In the first subchapter I will discuss preparedness in relation to learning from different 
perspectives, going from preparedness as a process and planning before going into the debate 
about individual and organizational learning. In this way I will seek to tie preparedness and 
learning closer together, laying the groundwork for the further discussion in the following 
subchapters. 
 
6.1 Preparedness and Learning 
As we have seen in the literature chapter, preparedness is a multi-faceted term and can represent 
a sortie of disciplines and sub-disciplines. My aim in this thesis is to build on recognized 
research and theory within the field of preparedness and end up with new knowledge and insight 
that could propel the field of preparedness even further. Through models like Kruke (2015) 
phase model we get a representation of preparedness as three phases in a continuous process. 
The model set itself apart from similar models, with its focus on the new normal one arrives at 
after handling a crisis. In previous research we have seen an exaggerated focus on post-crisis 
learning (Anderson, 2010; Staupe-Delgado, 2018); even controversies and critical questions if 
such learning is even possible (Burgess et al., 1997; Smith & Elliott, 2007; Toft & Reynolds, 
1997). As we have seen in the analysis, learning is absolutely possible in all phases of crisis, 
and especially noteworthy; ahead of crisis as a part of the pre-crisis phase. I argue that learning 
could and should be on the agenda in all phases of crisis, and that pre-crisis learning have stood 
in the shadows of post-crisis learning for too long. With pre-crisis learning; one could engage 
in preparedness activities, that develops preparedness capacities in accordance with, that will 
put any preparedness actor better suited to encounter and handle a crisis.  
Another aspect touched upon in the literature and recurring as implications during the analysis 
is the debate revolving who learns? Where there have been heated debates about the level of 
learning (e.g. individual or organizational) going as far as claiming that only individuals are 
able to learn, and through a more nuanced perspective suggesting that organizations indeed are 





When it comes to individual learning, there has to be content for the individual to acquire or 
draw from direct or indirect experience (Sommer & Njå, 2012). Examples on the content of 
learning could be, skills, behavior or how to understand or interpret (new) situations. When 
viewing learning solely from the individual’s perspective, one could argue that learning occurs 
among individuals in the preparedness organizations at Svalbard. The analysis shows several 
examples of individual learning, within all the examples on content of learning. On the other 
hand, the individuals learn both from their own experiences, to and from each other and from 
other’s experiences. These observations pave the ground for organizational learning rooted in 
individuals and intra-organizational learning, within and throughout the organization itself, 
back to new individuals.  
As we have seen in the analysis, it is definitively room for both individual and organizational 
learning in preparedness organizations. In relation to the ongoing debate about who learns, I 
would argue that learning is possible as both individual and organizational through individuals, 
but also internally in the organizations as well. The dive into the formalization of tacit 
knowledge, that will be discussed in detail in a later subchapter, shows that intra-organizational 
learning is possible, and it is reasonable to view it as an asset for improved pre-crisis learning. 
To answer Eriksson (2015) rhetorical question; if organizational learning could be viewed as 
something bigger than the sum of individuals who have learned, the preceding analysis and the 
topics discussed above indicates that it indeed is possible. As such, this analysis fits well with 
initial assumptions that learning can contribute to preparedness; and that organizational learning 
is possible both through individuals and within and between organizations as well. Although 
the focus lies on pre-crisis learning, one could view hard earned lessons-learned during training 
and exercise, as a miniature display of post-crisis learning. Even though a crisis never occurred; 
there is a probability that lessons-learned stems from some form of unwanted or unexpected 
incident. As such making organizational learning or the potential for it applicable in both pre-
crisis and post-crisis phases. 
 
6.2 Learning Through Social Relations 
In this subchapter I will discuss learning through social relations and arenas. As we have seen 
previously throughout the thesis, preparedness and development of preparedness capacities can 
be difficult in rural areas with challenging presets and conditions. In the analysis we have seen 
several examples on how learning can be achieved through social relations and arenas. Under 




be several factors in place to cultivate and nurture Communities of Practice; like a Domain, that 
we in the analysis have seen represented through shared preparedness challenges in a 
challenging Arctic environment. Within the domain it needs to form a Community of 
(preparedness) actors, with a common goal in increasing their mutual knowledge, to broaden 
and develop their preparedness capacities; like the various preparedness organizations found at 
Svalbard. Finally, the actors must interact with each other in a constructive way, sharing their 
practice; like in exercise Polar Night, or at the various social arenas where preparedness actors 
meet and socialize in the community in Longyear, and at Svalbard as a whole. 
If we view Communities of Practice in relation to preparedness as a whole, I would argue that 
Communities of Practice could be utilized as a potent factor for building preparedness 
capacities. In one way one could view Communities of Practice, if applied specifically for 
preparedness organizations, as a preparedness activity; in the sense of Communities of Practice 
potential for increasing timely and relevant knowledge within the topic at hand. To develop and 
later nurture arenas like Communities of Practice, one must take the social aspect into account. 
Through social arenas ranging from formal meeting places like workgroups, meetings or 
conferences; via semi-formal settings like exercises or cooperative training; to the more 
informal arenas like cafes, coffee-machines or just random meetings at the street or in the city 
center; it will be a potential for practice sharing, and development of new timely knowledge 
that could serve useful in the future.  
If we should draw some lessons from the analysis regarding Communities of Practice between 
preparedness actors, I would stress the positive effect these semi-formal and informal social 
arenas have for cultivation of present knowledge and development of new improved 
knowledge. Viewed in relation to the preparedness process and learning, this is a powerful asset 
and should be given more consideration in conventional approaches to development of 
preparedness.  
In the Arctic, preparedness actors in a way are ‘forced’ to cooperate and develop Communities 
of Practice. The harsh conditions and scarce resources make it an essential necessity, to achieve 
the most out of the preparedness work in the region. I would argue that the abundance of 
resources e.g. personnel, equipment, infrastructure and so on, widespread government agencies 
and redundant systems preparedness is founded on that we find in mainland Norway; compared 
to Svalbard, makes the preparedness work at the mainland more achievable without necessarily 




I would argue that these lessons from the Arctic region is relevant for preparedness 
organizations in other regions and could add a dimension to preparedness work at for example 
the mainland of Norway, or in other countries or regions with a high focus on preparedness. 
Cultivation and development of Communities of Practice could be achieved at a low cost and 
yield tremendous rewards when it comes to develop and improve existing preparedness 
structures and capabilities. 
Another important aspect when it comes to Communities of Practice is its potential for being 
an incubator for cultivation and harnessing of tacit knowledge. In the analysis we saw several 
examples on Communities of Practice, like the planning of exercise Polar Night, preparedness 
councils, rescue management and so on. These communities bring different actors together and 
lays the groundwork for sharing and developing practice. Within these forums and 
communities, tacit knowledge is cultivated en masse, harnessed, developed and adjusted to the 
different organizations and their needs, before its finally distributed throughout the various 
organizations. Illustrating initial assumptions that Communities of Practice can be incubators 
for cultivation and management of tacit knowledge.    
 
6.3 Social Relations and Cultivation of Tacit Knowledge 
In this subchapter I will discuss how tacit knowledge could be cultivated from social relations 
and arenas, to contribute to preparedness structures and capacities. With this effort I seek to 
contribute to the existing literature on Communities of Practice and management of tacit 
knowledge, through a reconceptualization where I bring the two fields of research closer 
together and illustrate a new approach to management of tacit knowledge based on Nonaka and 
Takeuchi (1995) SECI-model. 
Through a shared domain, community and practice a group of individuals or organizations could 
develop a Community of Practice (Wenger et al., 2002). As we have seen with the preparedness 
actors at Svalbard, they are part of the same domain, through shared challenges like harsh 
climate, scarce resources, low population and scattered settlements and activity. Within this 
domain, communities have formed. In this context the communities consist of preparedness 
actors at Svalbard, participating and cooperating within the realm of preparedness. Within the 
communities, practice is cultivated, tweaked, honed and shared.  
In the context of this thesis, we could go a step further when it comes to practice and see how 




many, when it comes to shared practice (as it probably should be, in generalized models meant 
to apply to a wide variety of organizations). In hindsight of my analysis, I would argue that tacit 
knowledge is significantly more important and vital, for development of preparedness (and 
preparedness organizations). If we factor in the harsh conditions and scarce resources 
represented in the Arctic region, it become even more evident.  
With limited resources and few if any realistic options for imminent support from the mainland, 
in case of an emergency or disaster the picture paints itself. One must look for alternative ways 
to improve and hone preparedness capacities. As we have seen in the analysis, all the different 
variations of cultivation and management of tacit knowledge is present within the preparedness 
organizations at Svalbard. This fact builds up under my argument, that both cultivation and 
management of tacit knowledge could be a vital asset for improvement of preparedness 
capacities.  
In the analysis we saw several systems and approaches to cultivation and management of tacit 
knowledge, where an approach or system would fit better with certain parts of Nonaka and 
Takeuchi (1995) SECI-model. With this in mind it is important to highlight, that the SECI-
model is an adequate model when it comes to illustrating the different forms tacit knowledge 
could take, and how it could be transformed to other forms. The four different phases mainly 
explain different ways of management and sharing of such. I would argue that a conscious 
approach towards cultivation of Communities of Practice between preparedness actors, would 
lay a good foundation for cultivation and harnessing of tacit knowledge. In the next phase, the 
tacit knowledge must be processed within the organization and made ready for distribution back 
to other and new individuals in the organization. Social relations and arenas can contribute to 
both cultivation of tacit knowledge as well as preparedness. With effective use of tacit 
knowledge accumulated in the organization, the potential for increased preparedness is 
imminent. Or in other words; With this approach the organizations can increase their current 
knowledge and in addition increase the potential for new (timely and relevant) knowledge. By 
combining the different forms of tacit knowledge from the SECI-model, and utilize it among 
the individuals, within (and between) the organizations; proactive learning that supports 












In this chapter I will present my conclusions for this thesis. I will start with answering the 
research questions one through three; to cover the different parts of this thesis, leading to an 
answer to the main thesis question: How could social relations and cultivation of tacit 
knowledge improve preparedness in the Arctic? 
Through the research of this thesis we have seen that learning in preparedness organizations 
can take different shapes and turns. Through cooperative mindset, safety culture and proactive 
organizations, learning occur both at the individual and organizational level. We also see a 
focus towards learning from past mistakes and incidents, through reporting regimes and 
systems. Both individual and organizational learning is achievable, and we have seen examples 
on how organizational learning happens both through individuals and within and between the 
organizations themselves. In relation to the literature the results of this thesis support the stance 
of organizations being able to learn (in both pre- and post-crisis phases). 
In this thesis we have seen that Communities of Practice can contribute to learning in 
preparedness organizations in several ways. The initial capability of contributing to learning is 
seen with the formation of the communities where actors from the whole preparedness 
community is represented. This arena opens for sharing of information and knowledge that can 
prove useful across the different organizations and among the individual members as well. This 
shared practice opens for new ways to view the existing knowledge, that opens for new ideas, 
knowledge and practice in the future. The other aspect of Communities of Practice role for 
learning in preparedness organizations, is its role as an incubator for tacit knowledge, that could 
be cultivated, harnessed and managed for future use. In the literature we see few studies 
focusing on this aspect of Communities of Practice. This thesis goes a long way to contribute 
to new knowledge around this aspect of Communities of Practice. 
As the discussion has shown us, management of tacit knowledge could be a potent asset for 
organizational learning. When seen in relation to the preparedness perspective (and as a 
preparedness capability), tacit knowledge can contribute to achieve preparedness. When tacit 
knowledge is made explicit it is possible to systematize and develop before distributing it back 
to new or existing individuals within the organizations. In areas with scarce resources and harsh 
climatic challenges, it is imminent to have an effective preparedness apparatus, that make use 




approach to management of tacit knowledge, the organizations and individuals indeed can 
increase their preparedness and solve their missions in a safe manor in the future. 
In conclusion; Lack of resources, scattered population and harsh climatic conditions makes 
preparedness a challenging endeavor in the Arctic. As such, one must utilize every asset 
available to develop and increase preparedness even further. Through social relations and 
arenas, individuals and organizations that share a common goal in increased preparedness; 
could meet and share their cumulative knowledge and experience. These Communities of 
Practice could in turn serve as incubators for cultivation, harnessing, honing and 
systematization of tacit knowledge. Through management of tacit knowledge, both new and 
existing individuals can achieve knowledge without having to experience a situation first hand, 
increasing their ability to encounter a situation or incident better prepared than without this 
knowledge. The combination of the four phases of tacit knowledge and the existing 
Communities of Practice, makes up a positive circle of knowledge accumulation, sharing, 
processing and re-sharing, and as such improve the overall preparedness and the underlying 

















7.1 Policy Recommendations 
For increased preparedness in the future, I would recommend organizations and leaders to 
consider developing and employing Communities of Practice, in a manor suited for the various 
organizations. Through these social arenas tacit knowledge can thrive and be harnessed, and if 
managed properly, contribute to effective organizational learning contributing to preparedness. 
One could imagine there is just as many approaches to this as there are organizations, and it is 
probably true. Based on my research on Svalbard, seeing the various organizations utilize both 
social arenas and management of tacit knowledge, it is my firm belief that all organizations 
have a potential for succeeding with the same, if they develop arenas and management strategies 
suited for their respective organization. 
Recommendations summarized: 
- Identify the current situation of the preparedness within the organization. 
- Develop social arenas, where knowledge can be developed, tweaked and shared. 
- Build systems to harness the tacit knowledge present within the organization. 
- Develop a system for management and refinement of tacit knowledge, with intent on 
distributing it back to new and existing individuals in the organization 
 
7.2 Limitations  
While this thesis has aimed to broaden our knowledge around social relations and their role for 
learning in preparedness organizations, the thesis has its limitations. As a qualitative research 
project performed as a case study, I have had to prioritize and scale the project in an effective 
manner. This has affected the methods for data gathering, where I have chosen to not utilize 
document analysis for data gathering purposes, but rater only as support for the development 
of the thesis. Among other things affected we find, number of informants, research trips 
frequency and the scope of this thesis.  
As the research fields of preparedness and organizational learning are immense, I have chosen 
to narrow down to the topics treated in this thesis; how social relations and management of tacit 
knowledge can contribute to learning in preparedness organizations. I therefore limit my 
research to concentrate on selected approaches to development and management of 
preparedness and put it in relation to social relations and arenas, where I have chosen Wenger 




to management of tacit knowledge to explore how these fields can enable each other and 
contribute to preparedness. 
 
7.3 Further Research 
The process of writing this master’s thesis has been long and dynamic. In hindsight of this 
thesis, I have reflected upon how this thesis could be an asset for future research; and how future 
research could propel the field of learning within preparedness organizations even further.  
For future research into social relations and tacit knowledge, it could be interesting to explore 
other branches, where risk, time pressure and demands in regards of uptime, delivery and so on 
is critical, like with various providers of critical infrastructure e.g. information technology 
infrastructure, financial services, logistics, energy production and so on. 
It is reasonable to assume that findings from the study of the preparedness community on 
Svalbard, could be customized and deployed in other organizations with positive effect. It could 
be interesting to pursue this perspective, through implementing findings from this thesis, into a 
new organization, and see which effects it would have on overall preparedness. 
In a method perspective I would encourage recruiting more informants from a wider selection 
of organizations within the branch studied, to achieve an even better understanding of the 
phenomenon. I would also recommend an increased focus on document analysis as a data 
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